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I:< THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~OCKY

MOUNTAIN GIANT
INC. ,

TIRE SERVICE,

PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.
BRAD RAGAN,

INC . ,

Case No. 15553

DefendantAppellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action in contract wherein the DefendantAppellant agreed to purchase from Plaintiff-Respondent certain
tires for recapping purposes.

Respondent seeks recovery from

Appellant in the sum of $5,575.00 plus interest and costs as
payment for a portion of the subject tires which Appellant rejected
as being unrecappable and of no value.

Respondent does not

necessarily dispute Appellant's assessment of the condition
and quality of the rejected tires, but rather claims that Appellant agreed to purchase all of the subject tires without regard
to inspection or fitness for recapping purposes, and, in effect,
agreed to assume the risk of taking the bad along with the
good,
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B.

Disposition in the Lower Court.

Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff-Respondent as
prayed in the sum of $5,575.00 plus costs.

The court also

awarded Respondent pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at
the respective per annum rates of 6 and 8 per cent.

c.

Relief Sought on Appeal.

Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court and
judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, to the effect that
the evidence and findings do not support the judgment entered
below, or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the trial
court for further findings of fact crucial to a proper dispositL
of this case as hereinafter set forth.
D.

Statement of Facts.

Both parties are in the tire business.
is engaged in the retail tire business.

Respondent

Appellant's branch

in Tucson, Arizona (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant") is
primarily engaged in the business of recapping and selling large
truck tires used in mining operations (TR. 126, 127).
Some time prior to September of 1975, these parties
entered into an oral agreement wherein Appellant agreed to pur·
chase from Respondent certain used tires discarded at the Kenne·
cott Copper Mine operation, with the intent of recapping them
for resale to mining operations in Arizona.
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Prior to shipment of the subject tires, employees of
both parties looked over some of the tires at Kennecott which were
potentially to become part of this agreement.

Respondent claims

that Appellant's employee saw 80 per cent of the subject tires
on that occasion (TR. 115, 11. 28-29; 116, 11. 19-24).
Shipments began on September 16, 1975, and continued
through November 6, 1975 (P. Ex. 1).

The last shipment of

tires arrived at Appellant's place of business prior to
clovember 29, 1975 (TR. 121, 11. 9-19).

The aggregate amount

of invoices covering all 70 tires is $15,100.00.
During the period of time between October 24 and December
19, 1975, Appellant made three payments for tires received and
accepted by it, and Respondent credited Appellant's account in an
amount equal to the aggregate price of 11 tires, which, after
inspection, Appellant rejected as being unrecappable.

The

agqregate sum of these three payments and credits given is
$9,525.00, leaving a balance of $5,575.00.

Appellant maintains

that this amount covers tires which it found to be unrecappable
in addition to the 11 for which credit was admittedly given.
Respondent makes no contention that the disputed tires were
not defective, but rather maintains that Appellant agreed to
purchase them without regard to their condition.

Herein lies

the heart of this case, i.e., did Appellant unconditionally
agree to purchase all tires which Respondent elected to ship,
or did it, rather, retain the right of reasonable inspection
and rejection of defective goods?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It is important to note that the used tires which a;c
the subject of the disputed agreement are large and

expensi~,

the average retail price of one, for example, in recapped cone::,
is approximately $7 ,000. 00 (TR. 129, 11. 25-30).

Defects in

such tires which prevent recapping are only ascertainable after
each tire is subjected to certain sophisticated mechanical
procedures (TR. 129, 11. 10-30.).

In any event, a determinatk

of the recappabili ty of any such tire cannot be made by visual
inspection alone (TR. 116, 3-14; 127, 11. 25-27).

Appellant

contends that after subjecting each tire to the necessary
inspection procedures, it found many to be unrecappable which
it rejected and was under no obligation to accept.

It is for

those particular tires that Respondent seeks payment in this acj
Some time after the last shipment of tires, Responde:,:
employee and only witness at trial, Ralph D. Albertson, met wi:'
Appellant's employees on or about November 29, 1975, for the
purpose of ascertaining and collecting the outstanding balance
of payments due on all tires subject to these transactions (TR.i
11, 6-11; 111, 11. 7-8).

meeting.

Two important things resulted fromt:

First, there was a discussion regarding defective ti:·

and the manner of their disposal (TR. 122, 11. 4-20).

Second,

during the course of the meeting, a statement of Appellant's
account was computed showing the outstanding balance to be
$ 4 , 8 2 5 . 0 0 (TR. 118 , 11. 12 - 19 ; 119 , 11. 4 - 8 ; 12 0 , 11 · 1 -14 ;
142, 11. 27-30; 143, 11. 1-14; 159, 11. 2-9; 162, 11. 13- 26 ;
D. Ex. 15).
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Pursuant to Respondent's instructions, Appellant
removed the defective tires to a local landfill at its own
expense.

Shortly thereafter, it received notification from

Respondent to "hold all tires that you reject from this company.
These tires must be rejected in the presence of both parties
and proper credit invoices written."

(P. Ex.

8).

Inasmuch as Appellant had already carried to a conclusion
the instructions to scrap the bad tires, it sent a letter of
explanation, dated December 10, 1975

(P. Ex. 10), apprising

Respondent of the fact that the disputed tires were available
for its inspection or use at the Tucson landfill.

Respondent

made no effort at this time, or on any occasion, to conduct
its own inspection of those tires which were rejected by Appellant.
Appellant testified, in fact, that on the occasion of November
29, 1975, it invited Respondent's employee to inspect the rejected
tires; Respondent denies this, but does not aver that it was
ever prevented from inspecting the rejected tires.
In short, it was clear from the outset of these transactions that the tires were to be purchased for recapping purposes.
Not all of the tires were recappable.

Appellant maintains that

there were many defective tires in addition to those 11 for which
credit was given

(P. Ex. 2).

Respondent did not re-inspect the

bad tires following notification of their rejection, although
it had opportunities to do so, and does not contend that the
rejected tires were in fact recappable.

Its contention is
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simply once Appellant visually inspected a portion of the tire:.
it agreed to purchase all 70 without the right to inspect therr.
further or reject those unfit for recapping.

POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR PLAINTIFF
BELOW, ROCKY MOUNTAIN GIANT TIRE SERVICE,
INC., IN THE SUM OF $5,575.00.
Depending on one's point of view, the findings of th:
trial court entered in support of its judgment for

Plaintiff~

either fatally inconsistent or fatally incomplete.

In either

event, they are inadequate to support the judgment entered bel:.
The threshold question, and the pivotal point of thi:
lawsuit, was correctly identified by the trial judge wherein h:
stated at the conclusion of closing argument, " . . • it seems t·:
me that I have got to determine what the agreement between
these parties was.

.

. " (TR. 177, 11. 6-7).

More specifica:
I

the issue is whether the Appellant agreed to pay for all tires·
shipped by Respondent, regardless of whether each tire was
recappable and, therefore, of value to Appellant, or whether
Appellant agreed to pay for all tires received by it from Resf:
dent which, after inspection, were found to be recappable·
A review of the record below reveals that the trial
court failed to carry to a conclusion its expressed intention'
determining the nature of the agreement as between these part!'
as to this particularly crucial issue.

No finding was enterec
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below as to whether or not the sale of the subject tires was
conditioned upon their fitness for which they were purchased,
i.e. , recapping.
In deference to the trial court and the prevailing party
below, it may be argued that inasmuch as the evidence, findings
and judgment below must be viewed in the light most favorable
to Respondent and every reasonable inference favorable to Respondent must be drawn therefrom, Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator
Supplies Co., 2 Ut.2d 289, 272 P.2d 583

(1954), one must conclude

that the trial court inferentially found the subject agreement
to be unconditional to the exclusion of the buyer's right of
reasonable inspection and rejection of non-conforming goods.
The supportive reasoning for this argument would be that the
trial court found

(1) that ".

.

• the defendant purchased from

the plaintiff a quantity of used tires for an agreed total
purchase price of $15, 100. 00.
Fact #3); and

.

.

."

(TR. 82, Findings of

(2) that after subtracting all payments and credits

from the foregoing amount there remained unpaid the sum of
$5,575.00

(TR.83, Findings of Fact #4); therefore, the court

inferentially found that Appellant agreed to take the "bad
apples" along with the good ones and pay for them all.
Although this reasoning and conclusion may have some
limited persuasive appeal at first blush, a serious consideration
of the record below shows that it is not only unsupported by
the evidence, as set forth in Point II hereafter, but such an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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inference is precluded by the express findings of the court.
A further refinement of the aforementioned standard of review

~

that a missing finding of fact can be implied if its implicatior.
would be in harmony with the other express findings.
Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 140 P.2d 329 (1943).

Northern
To infe:

that the agreement was unconditional and that the purchase

of

the tires in question was not made subject to the right of reasc
inspection and the right to reject defective goods, is to draw
an inference which is incompatible with the express finding

of

the court that
• • . [O]n November 10, 1975, the plaintiff
issued a credit to the defendant for 11 of
said tires shipped by plaintiff to defendant
as aforesaid on November 6, 1975; that said
credit for $2,375.00 was for such 11 tires
found to be unuseable and rejected by
defendant through its manager in Tucson,
Arizona.
(TR. 82, Finding of Fact #3.)
Certainly it cannot be said or reasonably inferred
from the evidence and other findings of the court below that

t\

purchase of tires was not made subject to the right of inspect::
and fitness of goods while at the same time expressly admittin~
that the Respondent agreed to, and did in fact, credit the
Appellant's account for the defective tires.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The Standard of Review
If the express findings of fact of the trial court
are disregarded and the blind inference drawn that Appellant
agreed to purchase the subject tires from Respondent without
regard to their condition and without the right of reasonable
inspection, then we must turn our consideration to the evidence,
if any, in support of such inference.

A finding whether express

or implied cannot stand without adequate basis in the evidence.
In contrast with other jurisdictions, such as Arizona,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma and Oregon, which merely
require "some or any evidence" to support the findings of the
trial court on appeal,

(3 Pacific Digest "Appeal

&

Error", hn.

1010.1(3), supp.) this court has established a somewhat higher
standard of review regarding the quantum and quality of evidence
required to support findings of fact challenged on appeal.

This rule

is simply that the findings and judgment of the trial court
will not be disturbed on appeal if there be substantial and
competent evidence in the record to support them.
Board of Review of Industrial Commission,
1977); Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374

Mineer v.

572 P.2d 1364 (Ut.

(Ut. 1977); R. C. Tolman

Construction co. , Inc. v. Myton Water Association, 56 3 P • 2d
780 (Ut. 1977); Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Ut.2d 370, 510 P.2d
526 (1973).

on another occasion, this court referred to "this

same well-worn
and
time-honored
rule provided
of review
·"and in
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute.
of •
Museum
Librarysimilar
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was "substantial, reasonable and credible evidence" to support
the trial court's findings, a reviewing court will not upset
them on appeal.

Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co.,

23 Ut.2d 1,

455 P.2d 197 (1969).
The Evidence
The evidence submitted at trial is insufficient to
support either an implied finding of fact to the effect that
the purchase agreement was unconditional, or the express findinc;
that the agreed total purchase price was $15,100.00 (TR. 82,
Finding of Fact #3) and that, ". . • there remains due and owing :
from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of $5,575.00."
(TR.83, Finding of Fact #4).

With respect to the evidence

in this regard, there are six important points to take into
consideration.
First, the Respondent established by its own evidence
(P. Ex. 2) and the court found (TR.82)

that on November 10,

1975, the Respondent credited the account of Appellant for
11 tires which Appellant inspected and found to be unrecappable.
Obviously, Respondent would not have allowed a credit for bad
tires if the agreement required Appellant to pay for all tires,
whether good or bad, and, for the sake of argument, even if
the original agreement had been unconditional, Respondent's
conduct in giving credit for bad tires modified the original
agreement to the effect of making it conditional upon inspectic:
and fitness for recapping. In this regard, it is important
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to understand, that

~ore

than the 11 tires covered by this

credit were found to be unrecappable.

In fact, all of the

tires subject to the judgment entered herein for the sum of

$5,575.00 fall into that category.

(TR. 173, 11. 11-14.)

Second, on November 29, 1975, Respondent met with
Appellant in Tucson, Arizona.

In regard to that meeting, Respon-

dent's witness, along with Appellant's witness, testified that
Respondent instructed and authorized Appellant to dispose of any
and all bad tires.
Q.

(By Mr. Lewis) All right.
Now, let me
review this conversation that you had
with Mr. Murken in Arizona November 28th,
29th. Do you recall in that conversation
in which Mr. Murken told you that all of
the tires, the rejected tires were right
there in the lot and you could go inspect
them and you said, "No, I don't need to
inspect them," basically and then he said,
"Shall we discard them?" You said, "Go
ahead and discard them." Do you recall
that conversation?

A.

Only part of it.

Q.

All right.

A.

The part of discarding the tires.

Q.

And you -- did you tell him to go ahead
and discard the tires?

A.

The ones that were junk, if there were any.

Q.

All right.
So if there were junk tires
you told him to go ahead and discard them?

A.

If there were any, yes.

Tell me which part you remember.

(TR. 122, 11. 4-21.)
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Respondent's instruction and authorization to Appellan:
to discard the bad tires is again indicative of the fact that
both parties understood the sale to be subject to reasonable
inspection and the right of rejection for defective goods.

rt

should also be noted that once Respondent gave instructions to
discard the bad tires, Appellant had no other alternative but
to comply.

70A-2-603(1) u.c.A.

(1953, as amended) provides:

Subject to any security interest in the
buyer (subsection (3) of section 70A-2-711),
when the seller has no agent or place of
business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection
of goods in his possession or control to
follow any reasonable instructions received
from the seller with respect to the goods.
(Emphasis added.)
Third, pursuant to Respondent's testimony, the purpose
of the meeting of November 2 9, 19 7 5, was to determine and callee:
the balance of the unpaid purchase price for the subject tins
from Appellant (TR. 118, 11. 6-11; TR. 188, 11. 2-4).

This acco:'

ing was final inasmuch as Appellant had received from Responden: i
shipment of all of the subject tires prior to that occasion (TR.
121, 11. 2-21; TR. 140, 11. 1-3).

On that occasion, these partii

mutually agreed that the remaining balance on the unpaid purchas:'
price was $4,825.00 (TR. 119, 11. 4-8; TR. 120, 11. 12-14; TR.!
11. 17-19).

Accordingly, on that same occasion, these parties

prepared an accounting of all billable tires

(D. Ex. 15) (TR.:'

11. 29-30; TR. 159, 11. l-9; TR. 142, 11. 15-30).
It is obvious that the final accounting of billable
tires as represented by Defendant's Exhibit 15, did not accoun:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for all tires
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quick tally of tires accounted for by Defendant's Exhibit 15
equals 35, whereas Respondent shipped and invoiced 70 tires
(P. Ex. 1).

The fact that this accounting did not cover all of

the tires shipped regardless of their condition is further evidence that Appellant was not to be held liable for those tires
found to be unrecappable after adequate inspection procedures.
Fourth, within a week following the meeting of
November 29, 1975, Respondent sent a letter (P. Ex. 8) dated
December 5, 1975, which stated:
Please be advised to hold all tires that
you reject from this company. These tires
must be rejected in the presence of both
parties and proper credit invoices written.
Because of the anticipatory language of this communication,
it is clear that it refers to bad tires in addition to and apart
from those 11 already covered by Respondent's credit memorandum of
November 10, 1975

(P. Ex. 2).

The expressed intent of Respondent

therein is to inspect tires rejected by Appellant and prepare
"proper credit invoices" for those additional tires that were
unrecappable.
This communication of December 5, 1975, also shows
the nature of the agreement as between these parties, i.e.,
that the purchase of tires by Appellant was subject to reasonable
inspection and conditional upon their fitness for recapping
purposes.

Respondent clearly expressed its intention therein

to accommodate the Appellant with "proper credit invoices" for
all bad tires.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Fifth, because of the size and kind of tires

invo~~

a determination cannot be made as to whether or not a particuli:'
tire is recappable without first subjecting the tire to sophist:,
inspection procedures.

The undisputed evidence submitted to

the trial court in this regard established that the old rubber
must first be removed by a de-treading machine, some times
known as a "buffer".

At this point a visual inspection is

made primarily to determine how many cord bodies are exposed.
If the tire passes this first step, it is then placed in an
open steam kettle for a couple of hours and again inspected
for separations.

At this point, a final determination is made

as to whether or not the tire is recappable.

(TR. 129, 11. 7-1:

In any event, both parties agree that the recapping
potential of these tires is not subject to evaluation by visual
inspection, but requires the assistance of the mechanical proc0
described.

(TR. 116, ll. 3-14 - Respondent; TR. 127, 11. 24-30 ·

Appellant)
Because of the difficulty in determining the recappinc
potential of one of the subject tires, the trial judge erred in
analogizing the transaction between these parties to the sale
and purchase of a carload of apples (TR. 176, 11. 28-30; 177
ll. 1-2).

Whereas, the quality and fitness of apples for

any particular purpose can readily be determined by visual
inspection, the goods in this case are clearly of a different
nature and are not so easily inspected.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent also testified that when Appellant's representative was in Utah to negotiate the terms of this purchase
agreement, he didn't bother to even look at all of the tires that
were to potentially become part of the sale (TR. 116, 11. 19-24).
That fact, coupled with the requisite inspection procedures and
Respondent's lack of equipment to conduct such inspections in
Salt Lake City, Utah (TR. 20, 11. 10-14), are clearly indicative
of the fact that Appellant never intended to bind itself to
purchase all tire which Respondent elected to ship; if that
were the case, Appellant would have at least looked at every
tire it was to become obligated to purchase.
Sixth, Appellant's witness testified as follows:
Q.

[Appellant's counsel] Now, do you
recall any conversation with Mr.
Albertson [Respondent's employee]
regarding your inspection of the tires?

A.

All tires were subject to inspection
and that was the conversation that was
understood by both parties, that there
was no way he could receive monies from
Brad Ragan without the tires being
inspected.
(TR. 128, 11. 28-30; 129, 11. 1-3; see
also TR. 127, 11. 13-19; 128, 11. 24-27.)

On the other hand, the only scrap of evidence in support
of Respondent's contention that the subject purchase agreement was
unconditional was the self-serving testimony of its only witness.
Q.

[Appellant's counsel] And that's why
they took these tires to inspect them
and determine if they are recappable?

A.

He bought them as is here with his
inspection and my inspection.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

Then is it your testimony that the two
of you went over all the tires or only
a portion of the tires?

A.

I said 80 per cent of the tires.

Q.

And do you want this court to believe
that 20 per cent of the tires he bought
sight unseen?

A.

Correct.
{TR. 116, 11. 15-25)

Appellant contends that the trial judge failed to make

1

the important finding of fact as to the primary issue of this '
I

case regarding whether or not the purchase agreement was condit:J
upon inspection and fitness of the tires.

That finding cannot:,.
~

inferred from the decision of the trial court, and at the same
time find harmony with the express findings entered below.

But,

even if such a finding could be implied, or if the express find:'i
were given that effect, which Appellant contends cannot reasona:\
r

be done, the evidence is nevertheless insufficient to support
such a finding whether express or implied as shown by the fore·
going six points.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, this Appellant
does not ask the court to rule in its favor merely because
the evidence preponderates against the Respondent on this issue:
but, rather, because there is no substantial and competent
evidence to support a finding, whether express or implied,
that the subject purchase agreement was unconditional.

It

should also be mentioned that not only does the evidence sh~
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that the parties intended for the sale to cover only those tires
which were, in fact, recappable, but the controlling law protects
Appellant's right of reasonable inspection and rejection of
non-conforming goods as well.
(4), U.C.A.

In this regard, ?OA-2-513(1) and

(1953, as amended), states:

Unless otherwise agreed and subject to
subsection (3), where goods are tendered
or deliveredor identified to the contract
of sale, the buyer has a right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any
reasonable place and time and in any reasonable manner. When the seller is required
or authorized to send the goods to the buyer,
the inspection may be after their arrival. ***
(4) A place or method of inspection fixed
by the parties is presumed to be exclusive
but unless otherwise expressly agreed it
does not postpone identification or shift
the place for delivery or for passing the
risk of loss.
If compliance becomes impossible, inspection shall be as provided in
this section unless the place or method
fixed was clearly intended as an indispensable condition failure of which avoids the
contract.
Comment No. 2 of the Official Comments of the Uniform
Conunercial Code §2-602, adopted in this jurisdiction as ?OA-2-602
U.C.A., also states that the buyer's right to receive conforming
goods implies a right of reasonable inspection.

If after

inspection the buyer (in this case Appellant) discovers some
of the goods to be defective, his right of rejection of all
or part of the goods is protected by §70A-2-60l:
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on
breach in installments contracts (section ?OA-2612) and unless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy
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(sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may
{a) reject the whole; or
(b)
accept the whole; or
{c)
accept any commercial unit or units
and reject the rest.
The Conditional Agreement
If one concludes as the Appellant contends that the
agreement was conditional,

and that there is no substantial

competent evidence to support a finding whether express or
implied that the agreement excluded the rights df reasonable
inspection and rejection of defective goods, three additional
questions must then be addressed:
(1)

Other than the 11 defective tires covered by

Respondent's credit memorandum of November 1 O, 19 7 5, were there
additional defective tires received by Appellant from Respondent:
(2)

I f so, did Appellant properly notify Respondent

of the same and provide an opportunity for their inspection?
(3)

Did Appellant pay Respondent for all recappable

tires which it received?
(1)

There were many defective tires in addition to

those 11 for which credit was properly given.

In fact, all of

the tires which constitute the goods covered by the trial court'
judgment for $5,575.00 were not recappable.
70 tires

(P. Ex. 1).

(D. Ex. 15 and 13).

Respondent shipped

Only 35 of those proved to be recappab~
It is undisputed that the 11 tires covered

by Respondent's credit memorandum of November 10, 1975, were
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defective.

There is no evidence in the record to show, however,

that all of the balance of the tires were recappable.

In fact,

all of the evidence on this point was to the effect that many
of the tires subject to these transactions were defective.
Defendant's Exhibit 15 constituted a final accounting of all
billable tires which obviously covers only half of the 70 tires
shipped.

Defendant's Exhibit 13 shows the inspection history

and disposition of each individual tire.

Half of these tires

were found to be defective. Respondent's instruction and authorization given to Appellant to scrap the defective tires as
before described, along with the correspondence between the
parties as reflected in Plaintiff's Exhibits 8 and 10, establish
that both parties were aware of a number of defective tires
in addition to those covered by the credit memorandum.
(2)

Appellant gave proper notice of its rejection

of all defective tires and provided Respondent opportunities
to inspect them.

Respondent complained at trial that Appellant

did not notify it of the number of defective tires until the
meeting of November 29, 1975 (TR. 175, 11. 17-22).

To that

one must ask "So what?" The undisputed fact is that Respondent
was given notice on November 29, 1975, which was rather prompt
given the number of tires involved (70), the fact that shipments
of tires were still being made in that same month (P. Ex. 1),
and considering the nature of the inspection procedures
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involved.

In any event, there is no evidence in the record

as to any obligation on the part of Appellant to provide writt,
or more prompt notice than that which was in fact given in
The controlling statute regarding rejection of

this case.
goods states:

Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It
is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably
notifies the seller." §70A-2-602(1)
It cannot be reasonably said in this case that the
notice given on November 29, 1975, within a few weeks of the k
shipment, was less than "seasonable."
Respondent was indisputably put on notice in this
regard on November 29, 1975.

On that occasion Appellant prepar;

and submitted to Respondent's employee its final accounting
of billable tires (D. Ex. 15), which obviously excluded many
of the tires shipped (TR. 159, 11. 26-28), and they specificall
discussed the matter of defective tires and their disposal.
Appellant also testified that it submitted a workshE'
(D. Ex. 13) on each tire to Respondent showing the inspection
results; this, however, it denied.

Respondent further denied

that it was invited to inspect the defective tires on that
occasion as Appellant alleged, but Respondent suggests neithe'.
that its employee requested an opportunity to inspect nor was
prevented from inspecting the defective tires which the parties
admittedly discussed on that occasion.

. ·or·

Jl.ppellant further inr ·

Respondent as to the location of all defective tires in ordec
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:o faciliate their inspection by Respondent by its letter
of December 10, 1975 (P. Ex. 10).
The fact is that Appellant did absolutely everything
within its power to put Respondent on notice as to the number of
defective tires and to facilitate Respondent's inspection of
them.
Nevertheless, Respondent did absolutely nothing
to inspect or double-check those tires which Appellant had rejected
as being unrecappable.

The tires were not destroyed and were

available for inspection at all times.
Once seasonable notice of rejection was given it
became incumbent upon Respondent to conduct its own inspection
in order to assure itself as to the condition of the tires
or forego the right to claim that they were good and demand
payment for the same.

It was Respondent's own failure to act

in this regard that placed itself and Appellant in the present
situation, of which Respondent should not now be allowed to
take advantage.

Otherwise, it will always be in the interests

of one in Respondent's position to refrain from acting, thereby
enabling one to claim "as far as we knew the goods were fit
fur the purpose for which they were sold."

It should not be

allowed to better its position to the detriment of Appellant
because of its own failure to act.
(3)

Appellant made payment in an amount $50.00 short

of full payment for all recaopable tires.

The evidence shows
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that on November 29, 1975, the parties determined the outstandi:
balance of payment to be $4,825.00, which did not take into
account a check which was in the mail for the sum of $2,025.00
(D. Ex. 9).

Plaintiff subsequently issued a check for what

it calculated the balance to be in the sum of $2,750.00 (P. Ex,
1Lrecomputation of this accounting shows Appellant to have been
in error in the sum of $50.00.

To that extent, and to that

extent only, Respondent is entitled to judgment.
The Unconditional Agreement
Although Appellant maintains (1) that the court did
not make a finding of fact as to the important issue regarding
the nature of the subject agreement,

(2) that the express findir

do not permit an inference in Respondent's favor to the effect
that the agreement was unconditional, and (3) that the evidence
does not support such a finding whether express or implied,
consideration should be given to the other side of this

argume~·

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the original agreement
was unconditional and Appellant neither had the right of
reasonable inspection nor the right of rejection of goods unfit
for the purpose for which they were purchased; nevertheless,
on November 29, 1975, these parties negotiated the final balan·:
owing on Appellant's account to be $4,825.00 for all tires
shipped.

Appellant paid all but $50.00 of this amount.
As mentioned before, Respondent's employee traveled

to Tucson, Arizona, and on that occasion met with Appellant's
representatives for the express purpose of collecting the unF'
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balance of the purchase price for the subject tires.

One would

fully expect, and the evidence shows, that after traveling a
thousand miles, Respondent would at least identify the balance
of the total debt due.

That sum was calculated by these parties

to be $ 4 , 8 2 5 . 0 0 •
The Respondent's testimony on this point was as follows:

Q.

[Respondent's counsel] And in connection
with that [payment of money owed] you
had discussed with him [Appellant's
employee, Arlo Murken] sending you a check
for forty-eight twenty-five?

A.

Correct.
(TR. 111, 11. 10-12)

Q.

[Appellant's counsel] Wasn't there any
question as to the amount of the tires
that were received and the amount of the
tires for which payment allegedly was
due?

A.

The only thing I was looking for was the
balance of the money due on the invoices.
He and I did not inspect the tires down
there at all.

Q.

Now, how did you arrive then at the figure
that you said was due and owing of fortyeight hundred plus dollars?

A.

Mr. Murken and I agreed on each individual
tire price here and we wrote it up on the
invoice as such and he accepted it that
way.

Q.

And so you agreed at that time that there
was due and owing 4,825 dollars?

A.

An approximation, yes.
(TR. 118, 11. 6-19)

Q.

So at the time you were in Arizona which
would be October or November the 28th,
29th, in that area, you agreed that the
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amount owing to you was four thousand
eight hundred and twenty-five dollars?
A.

Right.
(TR. 119, 11. 4-8)

During the trial both counsel and the trial judge
disagreed as to what Respondent's witness had said in his prior
testimony respecting this point.

Both the court and counsel

for Respondent contended that the witness had not testified
that he had agreed that the balance of the unpaid purchase
price as $4,825.00.

The following clarification was then

immediately made by Respondent's own witness:
MR. LEWIS: They agreed four thousand
eight hundred twenty-five dollars was
owing.
THE COURT:
say that.

I didn't understand him to

MR. LEWIS:

Let me ask the question.

Q,

{Mr. Lewis) Isn't it true
at that time you agreed that's what
was due and owing?

A.

Yes.
(TR. 120 I 11. 8-14).

In the interest of fairness, Appellant must represen:
to this court that notwithstanding the foregoing substantial
testimony of Respondent on this particular point, its witness
did change his testimony on this point following the noon rece:

,,

(TR. 164, 11. 8-12)

Appellant maintains, however, that Respor..

change of story and self-serving testimony late in the trial i:
not only highly suspect but insufficient to rebut its own pre'
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testimony on this point, give-iat least at three different times
in the trial.

This is especially evident in light of the fact

that the comparatively substantial testimony given in this
regard was in response to questions from both counsel and at
one point followed a very clear argument to the point between
counsel and the court as to whether or not Respondent had agreed
to accept this sum as full payment; Respondent then again
testified that $48,25.00 was agreed upon as the amount owing.
It was also clearly established by Respondent's evidence
that all tires which it had shipped had been received by Appellant
prior to the November 29, 1975 meeting.

In this regard, Respondent's

witness testified that he was sure the tires had arrived prior to
that occasion (TR. 121, 17-19).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 shows that

the last invoice is dated November 6, 1975 and Respondent's
witness testified that shipment would have been within a "day
or so" following the day of the invoice

(TR. 121, 11. 5-8).

In other words, there was no serious contention that the accounting of November 29, 1975 was made prior to shipment or receipt
of all of the subject tires.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, a routine end-of-the-month
statement of account, is of no significant consequence.

There

is no evidence in the record as to who prepared this statement,
and certainly it could not have been prepared by Respondent's
witness, 11r. Albertson, inasmuch as his own calendar (P. Ex. 16)
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shows that he was either in Tucson, Arizona, or returning home
therefrom on the date of said statement.

There is no evidence

as to whether the statement was sent to Appellant or whether
it was received by Appellant.

In any event, it appears to

be a routine monthly billing prepared without knowledge of
the accounting and agreement struck between these parties on
November 29, 1975.
Finally, there is no dispute as to the fact that Appe:1
made payment on all but $50.00 on the unpaid purchase price as
agreed on November 29, 1975.

on that occasion, the parties

prepared Defendant's Exhibit 15 showing the unpaid balance
in the sum of $4,825.00, which failed to take into account
Appellant's check in the sum of $2,025.00

(P. Ex. 3).

Cons-

quently, Appellant issued a check in the sum of $2,750.00 (P.
Ex. 5) with a letter of explanation dated December 5, 1976
(P. Ex. 9).

With those payments Appellant paid its account

balance down to $50.00.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT DO NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT
ASSESSING INTEREST AGAINST APPELLANT ON
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT AT THE RATE OF
6.00 PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM DECEMBER 19,
1975, AMOUNTING TO $641.13 WITH INTEREST
ON THE TOTAL JUDGMENT AT THE RATE OF 8.00
PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF SAID
JUDGMENT.
The record is absolutely devoid of any proof or evide·•
or request of any kind that interest be assessed at the rate
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6.00 per cent per annum from Decewber 19, 1975 to the date
of the judgment.

Respondent neither prayed for such relief

in its complaint nor requested the same at the time of trial.
Furthermore, although Respondent did pray in its
complaint for interest to be assessed on the judgment, no proof
or evidence was profered at the time of trial in support of its
right to claim such relief.

Appellant submits that the trial

court erred in unilaterally granting such relief without any
basis of foundation whatsoever in the record.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Appellant respectfully submits that the
trial court erred in the following particulars:
1.

No finding was made as to the central issue of

fact regarding the nature of the underlying agreement, i.e.,
did Appellant unconditionally agree to purchase any and all tires
which Respondent choose to ship without even seeing all of
them and without the right to inspect and reject those which
were not fit for the purpose for which they were purchased, or
did Appellant agree to purchase only those tires which were
recappable.
2.

The evidence and express findings of fact do

not support or permit an inference to be made that the underlying agreement was unconditional in nature.
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3.

As a matter of law, Appellant retained the

right of reasonable inspection of all tires to ascertain
their fitness for recapping and to reject those which were
unrecappable.
4.

In addition to those 11 defective tires covered

by the credit memorandum of November 10, 1975, there were

defective tires for which no credit was given.
5.

Appellant gave Respondent proper notice of its

rejection of those defective tires and provided every opportunity for Respondent to inspect them.

Although Appellant

did everything it could have done under the circumstances,
Respondent simply elected not to inspect those tires which
Appellant found to be defective, and, in fact, authorized
Appellant. to dispose of the defective tires at Appellant's wff
6.

Appellant owes only $50.00 on its account with

Respondent for the tires it agreed to purchase.
7.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the

subject agreement was unconditional, as Respondent contends,
these parties agreed upon the sum of $4,825.00 as the remaininc
balance due and owing for all tires.

Appellant paid all but

$50.00 of this amount.
8.

The trial court erred in granting Respondent

relief in the nature of pre-judgment and post-judgment interes·
without any support in the pleadings of evidence whatsoever.
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Respectfully submitted,

P.C.

/',
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0

Attorneys for Appellant

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief to F. Robert Bayle, Attorney for
Respondent, 1105 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, postage prepaid, this 4th day of April, 1978.
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